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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 6300.

JESS ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
HONORABLE M. J. BRONSON, JUDGE.

ABSTRACT OF RECORD.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
Tr.p.
COMPLAINT.
20

On this 1st day of March, A. D., 1940, before
me, B. P. Leverich, City Judge and Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace of the City Court within and for
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, personally appeared L. W. Peirce who, on being, sworn
by me, on his oath, did say that Jess Anderson, on
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21

-2the 25th day of February, A. D., 1940, at the County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, did commit the crime
of INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, as follows,
to-wit:
Jess Anderson killed Clark Romney without malice;
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the State
aforesaid, in such cases made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
(Signed) L. W. Peirce.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, the day and
year first above written.
(Signed)

B. P. LEVERICH,
City Judge and Ex-Officio
Justice .of the Peace.

Filed March l, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
INFORMATION.
The Defendant, Jess Anderson, having been
heretofore duly committed to this Court by B. P.
Leverich, a committing magistrate of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, to answer to this charge, is
accused by CALVIN W. RAWLINGS, District Attorney of the Third Judicial District, State of Utah,
by this Information, of the crime of INVOL UNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, committed as follows,
to-wit:
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-3That on the 25th day of February, A. D.
1940, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Defendant, Jess Anderson, did unlawfully and
without malice kill Clark Romney;
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the State
of Utah, in such case made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
(Signed) CALVIN W. RAWLINGS,
District Attorney of the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Filed April 12, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
MOTION TO QUASH.
23

Comes now the defendant above named and
moves to quash the information filed in the above entitled matter upon the following grounds and for the
following reasons :
1. That said information does not charge the
defendant with the commission of an offense.

2. That the information was filed without the
defendant first having had or waived a preliminary
examination.
3. That there is more than one offense charged
in said information, not provided for by Section
105-21-31 of the Code.
4. That the Prosecuting Attorney did not have
authority to file the information.
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-4Said Motion is based upon the files and records
in the above entitled cause.
(Signed) EDWARD F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.

Filed April 19, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS.
24

Comes now the defendant above named and
without waiving any of his rights under the Motion
to Quash filed herein, moves the above entitled Court
to order the District Attorney to file a Bill of Particulars in the above-entitled matter, setting forth
the facts and circumstances as to how or in what
manner said defendant did on the 25th day of February, 1940, commit the crime attempted to be alleged in the information.
EDWARD F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.

Filed April 19, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
MINUTE ORDER.
25

On April 19, 1940, the court made and entered
its minute order denying defendant's motion to
quash and requiring the district attorney to file a bill
of particulars by April 23, 1940.
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-5(Title of Court and Cause.)
BILL OF PARTICULARS.
26-27

Comes now the State of Utah and in accordance
with Section 105-21-9, Laws of Utah, 1935, and in
pursuance to the order of the above-entitled Court,
furnishes the following Bill of Particulars in the
above-entitled case, to-wit:
TIME : That said offense occurred between the hours of 6:45 and 7:30 o'clock A.M.,
on the 25th day of February, A. D. 1940.
PLACE : That at said time the Defendant
was driving an automobile in a Northerly direction on a public highway, to-wit, on Third East
Street near to and approaching Twenty-first
South Street, within Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, and that the said accident occurred as Defendant was driving said automobile in the intersection of said Third East Street and Twenty-first South Street, and that at said time and
place, one Clark Romney was then and there
driving an automobile in a Westerly direction on
Twenty-first South Street, across the intersection of the Third East Street.
MEANS : That at said time and place the
said Defendant was operating said automobile
carelessly and heedlessly and with a wilful and
wanton disregard for the rights and safety of
others, and without due caution and circumspection and at such a speed and in such a manner as to endanger the life of one Clark Romney who was then and there driving an automo-
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-6bile West on Twenty-first South Street. Said
Twenty-first South Street being an arterial
highway with stop signs placed at the intersections of all streets entering the said Twentyfirst South Street; and that at the said time and
place, the said Jess Andersen was driving said
automobile at a speed in excess of Forty ( 40)
miles per hour, which speed was dangerous and
excessive, and that the said Jess Andersen did
not stop at the stop sign facing South on Third
East Street in a position visible to drivers entering Twenty-first South Street on said Third
East Street; and that the s~id Jess Andersen
drove said automobile into Twenty-first South
Street without stopping, and at a speed in excess of Forty ( 40) miles per hour into and
against the side of the automobile then and there
being driven in a proper manner, in a Westerly
direction by Clark Romney on said Twenty-first
South Street.
RESULT: That as a result of said collision between said automobile driven by the said
Jess Andersen and the said automobile being
then and there driven by Clark Romney, the said
Clark Romney received injuries from which he
died within the County of Salt Lake, on the 25th
day of February, A. D. 1940.
CALVIN W. RAWLINGS,
District Attorney of the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
By (Signed) BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS,
Assistant District Attorney.
Filed April 27, 1940.
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-7(Title of Court and Cause.)
DEMAND FOR FURTHER BILL OF
PARTICULARS.
28

Comes now the defendant above named and requests the above entitled Court to make an order directing the District Attorney to file a further bill of
particulars and set out therein the following:
(a) How or in what manner Defendant was
operating said automobile carelessly and heedlessly
and with a wilful and wanton disregard for the
rights and safety of others and without due caution
and circumspection and in such a manner as to endanger the life of one Clark Romney;
(b) Where and in what position the stop sign
was located so as to be visible to drivers entering
21st South Street, and how and in what manner and
at what speed the automobile driven by Clark Romney was operated.
F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.

EDWARD

Before the court entered the order concerning
the demand for further bill of particulars, the following transpired :
The Court: State vs. Jess Anderson.

r. r, r.
~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~

Mr. Roberts: In that case, your Honor, the
State will not prove any acts except as stated ; that
is, excessive speed and .going through a stop sign.

r. r. r.
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-8Mr. Richards: What about the allegation that
Romney's car was being driven in a proper manner?
Mr. Roberts: That is surplusage. It does not
matter how it was driven.
(Discussion.)
The Court: I am inclined to the view that the
Court would preclude the State from proving any
facts that they have not specifically alleged in their
Bill of Particulars. I don't see how the Court could
allow you to go into that, Mr. Roberts.
Mr. Roberts: I don't, either.
The Court: You have filed your Information in
which you have alleged certain facts. Now, the mere
fact that you say that he was careless and heedless
and wilful and wanton, and all those things, that
does not mean anything, does it, when you come to
the proof?
Mr. Richards: That is true, except that on a
general complaint, for instance, if we were ever in a
negligence case, and he alleged those, and I had not
come in here and had not made him get down to more
specific allegations, he could prove anything under
the sun.
The Court: In view of the limitations which
the District Attorney has placed on the State, and
the statement of the District Attorney that he considers himself precluded from proving any facts
other than the facts which he has alleged, and as set
out in his Bill of Particulars, I think that there is no
reason why I should not deny the demand for a further Bill of Particulars.
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-9Mr. Roberts: Of course, we will ask that the
proposition of recklessness be put to the Jury; but
the reckless driving will only prove the two acts.
The Court : The motion for a further Bill of
Particulars is denied.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
MINUTE ORDER.
29

On April 27, 1940, the court made and entered
a minute order denying defendant's request for further bill of particulars.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
MOTION.
30

Comes now the defendant above named and
moves the above entitled court to require the plaintiff to elect whether said defendant is to be tried for
the commission of the crime of involuntary manslaughter by having committed an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a
lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful
manner, or having committed a lawful act which
might produce death without due caution and circumspection.
Dated this 21st day of May, 1940.
F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.

EDWARD

Filed May 21, 1940.
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-10(Title of Court and Cause.)
MINUTE ORDER.
32

On May 21, 1940, the court made and entered
its minute order denying defendant's motion requiring the state to elect whether defendant would be
tried for the commission of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter by having committed an unlawful act
which might produce death in an unlawful manner,
or having committed a lawful act which might produce death without due caution and circumspection.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
62

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above entitled
matter came on regular for trial on the 21st day of
May, 1940, at the hour of ten o'clock before the
Honorable M. J. Brosnon, one of the Judges of the
above-named Court, sitting with a jury, the defendant being personally present, and the State of Utah
being represented by Calvin W. Rawlings and the defendant being represented by Edward F. Richards.
Whereupon, DR. KENNETH B. CASTLETON
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and
being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
Direct Examination by IJfr. Rawlings.

68

My name is Kenneth B. Castleton and I reside in
Salt Lake City. I am a physician and surgeon, licensed to practice in Salt Lake City, State of Utah.
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-11-

69

70

Qualifications of Doctor admitted. I knew Clark
Romney during his life and saw him on the 25th of
February of this year at the St. Marks Hospital.
When I arrived there he was alive. He died at approximately 2:30 that afternoon at the hospital. I
was present at his death. I made an examination of
him at the hospital and found he had a basal skull
fracture, multiple fractures of the ribs, punctures of
the lungs, and fracture of his left humerus. These
injuries were caused by an external force which
might have occurred in a serious automobile accident. In my opinion, his death was caused by such
injuries.
Whereupon, ALEX ENGSTRUM was called as
a witness on behalf of plaintiff and after being first
duly sworn, testified as follows :

Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings.

71

My name is Alex Engstrum. I reside at Draper.
I am a garage man and my garage is located at 7th
East and Draper Road. I have been in this business
for six years. I have owned an automobile and operated one since 1906. On the 25th of February of this
year I was in the vicinity of 21st South and 3rd East
in the automobile of Kenneth Silcox, of Riverton, at
about 7 A. M. in the morning. I was sitting on the
right side of the front seat and we were proceeding
east approaching the intersection of 3rd East and
21st South, when I saw a car coming from the south
on 3rd East and going through the intersection,
striking another car approaching from the east. The
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-1272

73

74

car from the south was a Ford V-8. I observed the
stop sign at the intersection at 21st South and 3rd
East which the Ford V-8 did not stop at before
entering the intersection. I have observed cars traveling and have a fair idea of the speed of such cars.
In my judgment the Ford V-8 when it entered the
intersection was going between 40 and 45 miles per
hour. The other car was an Oldsmobile and was
traveling west. The impact took place at about the
middle of the intersection. The Oldsmobile was on
the north side of 21st South. I observed the impact. I saw the Ford V-8 coming through the intersection. I hollered to Mr. Silcox, "Stop, they're going to hit!" We stopped immediately, and before he
got stopped we saw this V-8 hit the Oldsmobile. I
would say the V-8 struck the Oldsmobile in about the
center. And then the Oldsmobile seemed to rise up
in the air about 5 or 6 feet with the front end, then it
turned completely over twice. It came to rest on the
curbing between the sidewalk and the street on its
wheels. The motor was still running. Mr. Silcox and
I jumped out of the car and ran over there. I saw
Mr. Romney lying in the gutter. My wife and
daughter also came over and we picked up his overclothes that were in the car and put them under his
head to make him comfortable, but we could not
move him. The V-8 appeared to have the front end
smashed in very badly. After the impact it turned
completely around headed in a different direction
from which it came. It was headed south. We remained about thirty minutes and while we were
there the officers came. I didn't see Officer Pierce,
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75

but I saw another officer there. I don't know his
name. The cars were not moved before the officers
arrived. We left before Mr. Romney was removed.
The picture marked Exhibit "A" looks something
like the Oldsmobile. To the best of my knowledge
it is the picture of the car that we saw. The picture
marked Exhibit "B" appears to be the Ford V-8.
The Oldsmobile was coming toward us and I have no
judgment as to its speed.

Cross Examination by Mr. Richards.
76

77

78

The Ford stopped in the center of the road, it
was turned around. It was in the center of the intersection, but a little on the north side, about 10 feet
north of the center line on 21st South, and west of
the center line on 3rd East. I would estimate that it
traveled about 5 feet from the point of impact. I
observed the Ford first as I always look on intersections when I travel in a car. When I saw the Ford
first the car in which I was traveling was between 4
or 5 hundred feet away from the intersection. X-1
on the board is where the car I was in was located
when I first saw the Ford, at 4 or 5 hundred feet
a way would make the mark come below the bottom
of the board. But the distance between where the
arrow of 33113, coming down to the west line where
our car was located would be about 4 or 5 hundred
feet straight out in the street. X-2 is the point where
I first saw the Ford. I would say that would be
about 10 feet or 15 feet behind the stop sign which
is marked by a dot or circle. I never saw the stop
sign until the crash. Then I began to look around.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

79

81

82

I am not certain whether the Ford was behind or in
front of the sign when I first saw it. But in my
judgment it would be where the stop sign is located.
It hadn't yet passed the stop sign. When I first saw
the Ford I would say that it was about 39 feet south
of the south curb line of 21st South. I saw the Oldsmobile first when it was about 2 hundred feet from
the intersection. X-3 is where I first saw the Oldsmobile. It should be about 2 hundred feet from the
east line of 3rd East. I followed the Ford from the
time I first saw it until the time of the impact. It
just took a few seconds, and during that time I made
an estimate of the speed of the Ford. I did, after the
impact, figure the speed just for my own good, to see
what could happen in case somebody would come
that way at me, and to see whether I should step on
her and try to get by, or to stop. In fact, I studied
that quite a bit. I have met up with a lot of them
that same way. I also accidentally run stop signs
myself, and didn't know they were there. I saw the
Ford, then the Oldsmobile, and then almost instantaneously there was an impact. The first car I saw
was the Ford. The next car was the Oldsmobile, and
almost instantaneously after seeing both cars the impact occurred. When I saw the Ford I was about 4
to 5 hundred feet away. We started to stop immediately. Just after the impact we were about 15
feet from the west curb line on 3rd East street. We
came to a stop there, and that is where I saw the stop
sign. There was no other traffic that I noticed
either north or south of 3rd East or on 21st South
before or immediately after the impact. I had not
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83

87

seen much traffic since I passed the hospital. The
crash happened about 7 :00 A. M. We were traveling about 30 miles an hour. I was not acquainted
with Mr. Romney prior to the accident, and did not
know him. When I stated I saw Mr. Romney, I
meant that I had seen the gentleman that had been
thrown out of his car. The Oldsmobile went up in
the air 5 or 6 feet. It swerved over in the air two
times and lit on the pavement between the pavement
and the sidewalk. The two front wheels went off the
ground. I do not know whether the wheels were 5
or 6 feet, but the body of the car went that high, to
me. It seemed to roll over right in the air, hit again,
and rolled over once more, and then came to rest on
its wheels. I don't remember whether it struck on
the front or side. I did not see what distance it went
after it came down on its wheels. I was too excited.
I only saw one officer. I did not see Officer Pierce.
I do not know if only one officer arrived before we
left. I was paying too much attention to the one
that was injured.

Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings.

88

When we were moving east on 21st South I saw
the other car coming from the other direction about
4 or 5 hundred feet off, and as we got close to the
intersection, I turned my head to see if there was
anything coming from the intersection, and there
was a Ford coming. Yes, I saw the Oldsmobile first.
That was way down the street. When I first saw the
Ford, the Oldsmobile was entering the intersection.
Yes, I think I must have seen the Ford when we

at
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89

90

91

92

were about 4 or 5 hundred feet away. I guess we
were y8 of a block west of the intersection when I
first saw the Ford. I couldn't quite see whether
the Ford or the Oldsmobile entered the intersection
first, but it seems to me like the Oldsmobile entered
the intersection first. It was light. The sun was
about coming up, and the vision was good. I noticed
that Clark Romney was thrown out of the Oldsmobile, but I do not know what position the car was
in when he was thrown out. He was thrown against
the curb. He was lying with his head against the
curb at about a 45 degree angle out. I saw the defendant at the scene of the accident, but I did not
see him get out of his Ford.

Recross Examination by Mr. Richards.
Mr. Rawlings did not explain the distance to me
during the noon recess. That was my own rectification. I have head noises, I can't hear very well, and
I misunderstood the question. I did not misunderstand your question when I put X-1 and X-2. Yes, I
put figures that I saw the Ford first. I saw the Ford
coming-but the other car also-but I saw the
Oldsmobile coming down the street 5 hundred feet
or more. And after the crash, of course, we saw
both. Yes, after the crash I tried to figure out the
distance. Yes, when I was 4 or 5 hundred feet
away I did see the Ford. Yes, at the stop sign, but
I had seen the Oldsmobile previous to that time. I
did not see the Oldsmobile where I put X-3 right
after I had seen the Ford. That is the only thing
I want to correct.
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-17Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings.

93

During the noon recess Mr. Rawlings asked a
number of questions about where these cars were
located.
Q. This might be leading. Did I ask you to
change your testimony in regards to what you testified to this Ford?
Mr. Richards: Object to that as incompetent,
irrelevant, immaterial and not proper redirect examination.
The Court: Objection overruled.
No, you told me to testify nothing else and asked
me if I didn't see the Oldsmobile and saw the Ford,
which I did. He asked me to testify to the accident
just exactly as I saw it.
KENNETH H. SILCOX, being first duly sworn,
testified in behalf of the plaintiff as follows :

Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings.

94

My name is Kenneth H. Silcox. Mr. Engstrum
is my daddy-in-law, and was with me on February
25, of this year, at about 7:00 in the morning, at
which time I was driving a Chevrolet east on 21st
South. As I approached the intersection of 3rd East
Street, I noticed an Oldsmobile quite a little ways up
the street. I observed it coming into the intersection. I have driven an automobile about nine years
and have carefully observed automobiles traveling at
certain rates of speed. In my opinion, the Oldsmobile was not traveling over thirty miles an hour
when it entered the intersection. I did not see the
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Ford until it passed the stop sign. The Oldsmobile
had just come into the intersection before I saw the
Ford. The Ford hit the Oldsmobile broad-side. It
went into the air, turned over twice, and came to
rest between the road and the sidewalk. The motor
was still running and I went and shut it off. I did not
know Mr. Clark Romney, but I did see a man after
the accident. The Ford after the accident was facing toward the south and the front end was caved in.
There was a fellow and girl in it. The weather was
fair. I believe the lights were burning on the Oldsmobile, but I am not sure whether the lights were on
the Ford. I said that the Ford was going about 40
miles an hour, but that was just a guess.

Cross Examination by Mr. Richards.

97

98

I was driving the car but did not have any head
lights on. The sun was not up, but it was light
enough without lights. We had come from Riverton,
and I had had the lights on before I stopped at
Knowles Floral, Midvale, where I shut them off and
did not turn them on again. I do not recollect the
facts concerning the accident any better today than
when I testified at the hearing on March 27. When
I first saw the Ford I was coming up 21st South
about three or four hundred feet away. I didn't
see the Ford until it arrived at the stop sign. I
saw the Oldsmobile first. That is how far away I
was when I saw the Ford-just north of the stop
sign. I did not see the stop sign at that time. I saw
the Oldsmobile for some time coming down 21st
South. After I saw the Ford I looked again and
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saw the Oldsmobile just entering the intersection
that is crossing the east curb line of 3rd East Street.
I guessed at the speed of the cars first when they
asked me for my story. That was the second day
after the accident. I testified at the preliminary
hearing that I was unable to estimate the speed of
either the Ford or the Oldsmobile, that it was just a
guess and that I guessed 40 miles for the Ford. I
stopped about 15 feet from the intersection, im-_
mediately after the crash. As the cars came together the Ford struck the center of the Oldsmobile
and the Oldsmobile rose up in the front. Both front
wheels went about 5 to 6 feet up in the air. It
turned over and I do not know whether it struck the
ground until it lit on its wheels, although it looked
like the front end might have struck first and then
turned over again. I don't know whether the wheels
went up that far, but I could see plenty of daylight
under it. There was no other traffic on 3rd East
or 21st South at that time. The Ford did not go
far after the impact. It turned around. I did not
watch it very closely after it hit because I was
watching the Oldsmobile. I saw it after the accident and it hardly moved out of its tracks, only
just turned around.

Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings.
Yes, I said that the spot I indicated for the cars
was just a guess. I made the guess on what I observed. I based the guess on seeing the distance the
cars came. I saw the Oldsmobile come at least two
or three hundred feet. It is from this observation
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that I based my guess. It is pretty hard to guess
the speed of a car. I talked to Mr. Pierce, the officer,
at my place. I remember him asking me what was
the speed of the Oldsmobile and the Ford car.
Q. What speed did you tell Mr. Pierce that the
Ford car was traveling at at that time.
Mr. Richards: I object to that as incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial.
A. I told Mr. Pierce I did not know the speed
of the Ford, but in my judgment and my guess that
it was 40 miles an hour, but I did not know for sure.
That was just a guess. I told him between 40 and
45 miles an hour and that the Oldsmobile was going
about 30 miles an hour. That was two days after the
accident.
L. W. PIERCE, being first duly sworn, testified in behalf of the plaintiff as follows:

Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings.
108

109

My name is L. W. Pierce. I reside at 940 Lake
Street. I am traffic accident investigator of the
Police Department of Salt Lake City. I have been
on that detail since March, 1937. I do not have
charge of it, but I am an investigator. I investigated a collision at the intersection of 21st South and
3rd East on the 25th day of February. Officer Van
Ballegooie went with me. When we arrived there
the Ford V-8 was headed in a north-easterly direction. At the time of the investigation I made certain
measurements and observations from which I made
the drawing marked Exhibit "C". I made the sketch
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myself, and it is made to scale, and from that I made
the drawing on the blackboard. This street represents 21st South at the intersection of 3rd East.
This is east on 21st South and west on 21st South.
These lines here represent the lines painted in the
street, the center lines, and these two go through
the intersection, but the outside lines don't. This
outer line and the one near the curbing or parking
lane doesn't continue through the intersection. It
is a 6 lane highway. When we arrived there the
Ford was located in the position shown on the map,
and Mr. Anderson and the young lady sitting in the
Ford car. Mr. Anderson was behind the driver's
seat. Farther down the street was an Oldsmobile
standing on its wheels, the front end down off the
curb, the back wheels were up on the curb. At a
point 16 feet east of the Oldsmobile there was a
man lying in the street. I later learnP.d that it was
Clark Romney. His feet and body were in the
street, and his head was resting just on the curb.
Leading into the intersection on 21st South and
going in a northerly direction were some heavy tire
marks. These tire marks were 44 feet long; they
ended at a point 5 feet north of the center double
line of 21st South. From there one of these marks
went in the form of an arc and extended in a
northwesterly direction for 14 feet. The front of
the Ford automobile was 17 feet from the end of
the west brake marking and there were 4 skid marks
of 44 feet. The Ford was a four-wheel brake car.
The front one of the skid marks started 4 feet from
the south curb line and the other was 9 feet farther
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back. There was a stop sign that morning at the
intersection of 21st South and 3rd East, which is
indicated on the drawing. This street has a curb that
just goes around the corner; then there is a small
dirt bank that extends South about 24 feet, after
which the street widens out. There setting right
in the small bank was the standard reflector stop
sign. I do not know the size of it, but it was a
hexagonal size standing on a six foot four by four
post. There was written on it, "Stop," and
"Through Street". It stands 24 feet south of the
south curb line of 21st South. The skid marks did
start about 11 feet North of the stop sign. In my
observations I determined that the point of impact
was at the place indicated by "X", with a circle
around it. I determined that the whole front end
of the Ford car hit the Oldsmobile. At a point beginning 21 feet from the place where the brake
mark stopped, there were two large tire burns in the
form of an arc; one was 26 feet long, and the other
was 20 feet long. I couldn't find any beyond that
point. Beginning at that point to a point nineteen
feet further west, the pavement right on the north
painted line and on the curb was all gouged out and
was full of green paint for a distance of fifteen feet.
The color of the Oldsmobile was green. I did not
observe right on top of the Oldsmobile. I did observe a portion of the damage to the top. The part
in front, just above the windshield, was badly damaged on the left front corner. The grill and radiator
was broken out. The distance from the point where
the impact occurred, that is from the left front
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wheel of the Ford to the front end of the Oldsmobile, was 78 feet. Officer Van Ballegooie stood
at one point and I read the tape and took Mr. Anderson with me. The defendant was with me when we
made the measurements. Mr. Romney was put in
an ambulance and taken to St. Mark's Hospital. I
did not see him after that.
As an investigator for the Salt Lake Police
Department I have had the occasion to determine the
speeds that automobiles have been traveling, after
taking into consideration skid marks, weights of
cars and other matters. We have a formula for this
matter. Yes, I made a particular study in that regard. The formula we used was from the Northwestern University School of Engineering. We attended school at California held by Lieutenant
Kremel from the Northwestern University. I also
attended school at Pinecrest last year taught by the
International Association of Chiefs of Police and
received instructions from Sergeant Loveless of the
Indiana State Police. The formula used at both
these schools was the Northwestern University
formula. It is the length of the tire marks times
the coefficient of friction times a weight distribution
of the automobiles times the number of tires that are
holding. That would give you your product. You
then take the square root of your product times a
constant of 5.46 which will equal the miles per hour.
I have made practical applications of this formula
hundreds of times and the formula checked accurately. The university gave us a coefficient of
friction. The coefficient is determined by the sur-
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face of the highway. The highway at 21st South
is what is known as a bituminous asphalt highway.
The highway leading into the intersection on Third
East is an oil and asphalt surface. Taking into consideration the brake marks I used the formula to
arrive at the speed that the Ford car would have
been traveling had it come to a stop at X circle. The
factors taken into consideration is the coefficient of
the street and the weight distribution of the automobile. A Ford automobile has what is called a
fifty-fifty weight distribution, or the front end is
carrying 50% of the weight and the back 50%.
Therefore, each wheel would be carrying 25% of
the load. We do not consider the weight of the car.
That does not make any difference. Then we consider the coefficient of friction. I use .70. Bituminous asphalt very conservatively will run from .74
to .76. The reason I cut the coefficient down four
points is because there was a slight bit of dirt on
the highway right where Third East intersects with
21st South and the brake marks went through the
dirt. If the car came to a stop at X circle, it would
have been travelling 30.35 miles per hour. I have
taken photographs in relation to traffic accidents
ever since 1937. We carry a kodak in the car. It
is a 4.5 Graphite. I have been using that one since
March, 1937.
I had a conversation with the defendant at the
place of the accident. He said the cars had not been
moved; that they were in the position at which they
came to rest. The diagram shows where the cars
were when I arrived. Yes, I took a number of
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-25photographs of the scene of the intersection and the
cars. 'Yhat has been marked Exhibit "F" was
taken in front of Streator-Smith on the 26th day of
February. It is a photograph of the Oldsmobile
automobile that I found at the scene of the accident.
So far as I know the car was in the same condition
at the time I took the picture as it was right after
the accident. It looks just the same.
;122

(Exhibit "F" was offered and received.)
Exhibit "E" is a photograph of the front end
of the Oldsmobile and in my recollection the car
was in the same condition when this picture was
taken as at the scene of the accident.
(Exhibit "E" was offered and received.)
What has been marked as Exhibit "A" is a
photograph that I took of the left side of the Oldsmobile sedan.
(Exhibit "A" was offered and received.)

123

\Vhat has been marked Exhibit "B" is a photograph of the Ford.
(Exhibit "B" was offered and received.)
Exhibit "D" is a photograph of the Ford car.
(Exhibit "D" was offered and received.)

. 124

I took the picture marked Exhibit "H". It was
taken on the 26th about noon. I was standing 132
feet east of the east curb line of Third East Street,
looking west. Yes, there was a light pole at the intersection. However, the one you see in the picture
was on the north side of the street. There is a pole
a little further south than the stop sign on Third
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however, are on the north side of the street.
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I took the photograph marked Exhibit "G". I
was standing 54 feet south of the stop sign and
about in the center of Third East. I held the kodak
approximately four feet from the ground. Third
East is thirty-three feet wide. That is, where the
curb is. I was standing just about in the center
of Third East when I took the photograph. When
I took this picture I held the camera slightly east
and north so I could catch the stop sign and was
held approximately four feet above the ground.
Just how far east it was turned I do not know, just
a few degrees. I just moved it over so I could find
it and saw the stop sign and shot it.
Mr. Rawlings:

We offer in evidence Exhibit

"G".
Mr. Richards: We object to Exhibit "G" if it
is offered for the purpose of showing what might
be shown 54 feet back. It clearly showsThe Court : The picture was explained. It
would go more to the weight than the admissibility,
Mr. Richards. Objection overruled. It may be received.
(Exhibit "H" was offered and received.)

129

I had a conversation with the defendant in the
evening at which conversation Mr. Beckstead was
present. f had a statement with the defendant
relative to the speed that he was driving his Ford
car and about going through a stop sign. This conversation was reduced to writing. It is an accurate
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He stated:

11130

"I was driving about thirty-five or forty
miles per hour as I approached 21st South. I
was almost to the intersection when I noticed
the stop sign. I didn't know there was a stop
sign until I saw it. I applied my brakes and
tried to stop, but I skidded into the other car."
At that same time something was also said
about the driver of the other car. He stated:
"At the time of the impact I saw the other
driver fall out of his car at about the same place
as he was when the officer arrived. I don't
think the car rolled over him."
Cro.cls Examination by Mr. Ric:hards.

1 1131

The northerly end of the skid marks was five
feet north of the center line. From the center line
to the curb line is 35 feet. So it would be 35 plus
five, or forty feet, and this mark would extend four
feet south of the curb line. Forty-four feet is the
full length of the skid mark. That is, the most
northerly one, the one that extended furtherest
north. There were four separate skid marks. The
other skid mark stops nine feet back of the point X.
Mr. Rawlings: I will offer this sketch which
gives the scale, Exhibit "C", as an exact duplicate
of the sketch on the board.
Mr. Richards: I will agree to it, Mr. Rawlings,
as soon as I get X-1, X-2 and X-3 on that.
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Both skid marks are forty-four feet long. On
Third East Street where it enters 21st South there
is a concrete curb going around the corner. The
stop sign is setting on the most southerly edge of
the concrete. Then the street widens with dirt
shoulders. Yes, there is a telephone pole in front
of the stop sign a little further south and a little
further east, about the width of the pole further
east, that is the width of the telephone pole. In my
judgment it would be about fifteen feet further
south. It is very close to the stop sign. That is
not put on the map. When I took the picture shown
in Exhibit "G", I held the kodak so I would get a
good picture of the stop sign. The purpose of the
picture was to show the same. It was not taken to
show what you would see driving down the street.
I wanted to show the stop sign. It does not show
a telephone pole. I did not have anything to do with
working out the formula. I took the formula given
to me by someone else and after applying certain
facts came to the result I have given. It would alter
the results of my formula if the first two brakes
had taken hold for a certain distance and then the
other brakes extended beyond. The coefficient of
21st South was .74 and .76 and the coefficient of
Third East which is asphalt would run about .68 to
.70. Yes, there was some gravel, some dirt, on Third
East. The gravel was mostly pushed up onto the
surface of 21st South. By the surface of 21st South,
I mean after you leave the curb line. That is where
most of it was. There was very little back in the
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entrance. That would reduce the coefficient some
and that is the reason I took .70 instead of .76. If
it was on the .68 to .70 it would reduce it -very little.
The skid marks caused by the spin, those being 14
feet, were undoubtedly caused by the Ford from
the forward motion of the west-bound car when the
Ford went into its spin. Yes, I think when the cars
came together that the forward motion of the Oldsmobile twisted the Ford around so as to make it
face in the direction it was and that would cause the
skid marks. The stop sign is on a pole about six
feet high. The lettering is six feet or over above
the ground. The state law provides that your headlights are to show 42 inches above the ground at
seventy-five feet. As you get closer, your lights
may lower. That would depend, however, on how
high the lights were on the car. If the lights were
above 42 inches the light beam would be focused
toward the ground further ahead. I do not know
what height the right beam is on a Ford. I do not
know what time I arrived at the accident. I received the call about 7:00 A. M. and drove directly
there. It took me five to seven minutes to get there.
I was at the police station when the call came in.
The weather that morning was clear and the visibility was good. It was somewhat misty but not
enough to impair visibility to any great extent. The
pavement was dry. The sun was just coming up.
It was broad daylight. The condition of Third East
Street, of which I am somewhat familiar, isn't so
bad. It is a fair road. It has chuck holes in it but
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-30it is not bad. I don't know if prior to the time I
inspected it, which was after the preliminary hearing, it had been torn out putting in a gas pipe or
sewer. It looked as though it had, but I don't know.

Redirect E'xamination by Mr. Rawlings.
138
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When I took the photograph of the stop sign on
the south side of 21st South I was 54 feet back and
in my judgment the telephone pole is fifteen feet
further south. I made observations to see whether
it would block the view of a driver. It would not
block the view of a driver coming down the proper
lane.
The back wheels of the Oldsmobile were on the
curb and the front wheels were down on the street.
By curb I mean between the curb and sidewalk. At
one of the conversations I had with the defendant
at the scene of the accident, he said he had to go to
Magna to work. He said he had to take the young
lady home and go to work at Magna that morning
and that he had made arrangements with some
woman to call Magna.
Oh, yes, I know what you mean. He said that
he was in a hurry to get the young lady home to
get out to Magna to work.

Recross Examination by Mr. Richards.
I may not have remembered that at the preliminary hearing.
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\Vhereupon, SEYMOUR S. TAYLOR was called
as a witness on behalf of plaintiff and being first
duly sworn testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings.

l2

,3

My name is Seymour S. Taylor and I reside at
Salt Lake City. At the present time I am employed
by the Gallagher Company. For a period of years
I have been interested in traffic safety. I have
studied formulas by which the speed of a car might
be determined by the tracks of the car, skid marks,
coefficient of friction and weight of the car. I have
a Bachelor of Science degree from the University
of Utah in civil engineering and to obtain that degree I wrote a thesis on traffic accidents in Salt
Lake City. I have done further graquation work
at the University of Kansas and the University of
Iowa. I have received my Master's Degree. I submitted a thesis to the University of Kansas also on
the same subject of traffic accidents and investigations and the determination of speed of vehicles involved in accidents and collisions. I have been employed as· consultant by Kansas City and also I have
done some corresponding consulting work with Los
Angeles, Boston and Chicago. This employment pertains to general traffic problems but was mainly
based on accidents that had happened and engineering analysis of .these accidents. I was also connected with General Motors Proving Ground and
observed experiments in which these formulas were
used. I did some actual work with them and I have
also studied photos quite carefully that were made
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-32of tests they performed for the purpose of determining damage to vehicles. The purpose of the
tests at General Motors was to test the strength of
various types of construction. Cars were placed on
an incline to give them a predetermined speed and
then were allowed to collide with other vehicles also
moving at predetermined speeds. Other times they
were run into solid walls at various speeds. The
longest period I was at General Motors was three
weeks but over a period of the last five years I have
been there four times and spent probably a total of
three months there. From the formula I have given
you I am able to determine the speed of a car.
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I have examined Exhibit "C" and have made
an analysis of the situation so far as speed is concerned from the sketch itself, skid marks and type
of road. I also took into consideration the condition
of the two cars. I examined both cars on the 28th
of February. I saw the Ford at Petty Motor and
the Oldsmobile at Streator-Smith.
Exhibits "A", "E" and "F" are photographs of
the Oldsmobile that I examined and Exhibits "B"
and "D" are photographs of the Ford that I examined. In determining the speed of the car I took
into consideration the wheel marks or tire marks
as shown on the sketch being forty-four feet in distance before the point of impact. I can tell from
the tire marks the speed that the car was travelling
when the brakes first went on had the the car come
to a stop at the point of impact. Using my formula
and taking into consideration the fact that there
were skid marks at a distance of twenty-four feet
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on 21st South and nine feet on Third East. I can
tell the amount that the speed was decreased while
the brakes were applied. I have also examined the
construction of 21st South and Third East. The
skid marks were not all there when I examined it
two days after the accident so I U8ed the figur-es
given me by Officer Pierce. The other element I
used in connection with the formula is the coefficient of friction between the tires and pavement and
the length of the marks. I have made practical
applications of this formula.
I was with a party testing approximately twelve
cars with Ray Bestus Company on various types of
pavement, various cars, various types of tires, to
determine the coefficient of friction between those
tires and the different types of pavement. The coefficient of friction that I used was .7. During the
time that the brakes of the Ford were locked the
wheels were sliding, the speed was decreased approximately thirty-three miles per hour. I am able
to determine from my studies and have an opinion
after making observations of the automobiles and
a study of the surface of the two highways, 21st
South and Third East, and other elements that I
took into consideration, the speed that the Ford car
was going as it entered the intersection.
Exhibit "C" is a diagram that I prepared to
scale. The total energy of any moving body is well
known according to our laws of physics to be determined if the mass of the moving body is known
and its speed. Similarly, if we can determine the
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total energy of the moving body and know its mass,
its weight, we can determine its speed.
I have given you the formula that showed the
decrease of speed of the car over the forty-four feet
as evidenced by the skid marks and I have a satisfactory opinion as to the speed the car was going at
the time the brakes were first applied. That opinion
is made up of two factors. One is my conclusion
as to the decrease at the point of impact and the
other is the conclusion as to what happened after
the impact.

156

In arriving at proposition No. 2, the decrease
of speed from the impact, I have taken into consideration No. 1, the damage and extent done to the
Ford car; No.2, consideration of the extent of damage to the Oldsmobile car; No. 3, consideration of
the amount of energy involved in forcing the Oldsmobile to the pavement so that it leaped into the
air; No. 4, the amount of energy involved in forcing
the Oldsmobile from its intended path to a path ten
feet distant, approximately; No. 5, the energy involved by the movement of the Ford after the impact to its position of rest. This is all I am considering.

157

I can determine by formula the energy involved
in forcing the car to the pavement so as to make it
jump into the air. The formula is foot pounds of
energy are equal to the weight involved multiplied
by the distance through which that weight acts,
which is simply the weight of the car times the
distance. This is a mathematical, physical formula.
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It is a formula studied in all of the better schools.
I can determine by the same formula the energy
involved in forcing the Oldsmobile car from its intended path to the other path. It is an accepted
formula worked out on a mathematical basis and
adopted by all schools. I have seen this formula
put to practical operation. I can determine by
formula the energy involved in the movement of
the Ford car as it skids around into its rest position. That formula is based on the weight of
the car, the coefficient of friction between the tires
and the pavement and the distance through which
the car moves, which is also a recognized formula.
That leaves damage as the other proposition.

Distribution of weight on the various wheels
will change the coefficient of friction. I do not use
a distribution of weight formula. There is no
formula for determining the energy required to
damage a car to a certain extent. That is the only
other element that we have, the dama.ge to the two
cars.
I cannot arrive at the accurate speed that the
Ford was travelling at the time the brakes were
applied without that element. Leaving out the question of damage, I have an opinion as to the speed
the Ford was travelling when the brakes were applied. I can give the approximate speed and taking
100 as being the accurate speed, leaving out the
consideration of damage, my estimate would be 90%
or 95% accurate. I do not mean that the speed will
be 95% of the total speed because I have not been
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-36allowed to consider the damage but it would be
95% accurate without considering the damage.
163

165

I stated the other day that I had an opinion
relative to the speed that the Ford V-8 was traveling
at the time that the brakes were applied on Third
East as it entered the intersection of 21st South and
3rd East. I examined the cars on the 28th of February and went to the scene of the accident on the
29th. At that time I had not seen the sketch of
the accident and the placement of the cars. At the
time I visited the place of the accident I made observations as to the surface of the road at Third
East and at the point where skid marks appeared
that were later called to my attention on the sketch.
I also made an observation of the surface of the
highway known as 21st South Street. I made an observation as to whether at that highway there was
an incline or decline. I examined the tires of the
two cars and paid particular attention to the inflation of the tires.
It is a universally adopted formula by which
the degree of slowing down in the speed of an automobile may be determined from the brake marks.
The formula for speed in miles per hour is equal to
5.5 times the square root of the coefficient of friction
times the brake marks, assuming all four wheels are
sliding. That formula has been accepted generally
in the United States.

Mr. Richards: Object to that as a conclusion
of the witness, and move it be stricken.
The Court: Objection overruled.
elusion, but I believe he is qualified.

It is a con·
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\Vith that formula I have performed more than
one hundred experiments in testing. There are several other formulas but they resolve to the same
thing. This formula that I have given is derived
from the others. It is simply simplified to give the
speed in miles per hour, not speed per second.
I haYe seen Exhibit "C" before, which is the
sketch prepared by Mr. Peirce. I made a larger
sketch from Exhibit "C", drawn to scale. That is
the one I was testifying from yesterday.
(Exhibit "C" offered in evidence.)
Mr. Richards: I have no objection except that
it doesn't show all of the points around the accident. \Vith the understanding that the X's will be
placed on with the notations of distances-as I understand the map is not large enough to permit them
to be placed on according to scale, and show the
telephone pole.
Mr. Rawlings: We will agree that those may
be placed in this exhibit by Mr. Richards.
(Exhibit "C" admitted.)

168

What has been marked Exhibit "I" is a sketch
that I drafted myself. It is drawn to scale.
Exhibit "I" is offered in evidence and received with the understanding that it is merely an
enlargement so that the witness can testify a little
more accurately and is merely for the use of this witness and for no other purpose.
I saw Exhibit "C" about the first of March. I
considered the matters of distances, placement of
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cars, roads and other elements contained on the
sketch. I was advised what the boxes numbered 1
and 2 represent. I considered the tire marks.
Q. Mr. Taylor, taking into consideration your
investigation and observations made at the intersection of 21st South and 3rd East, taking into consideration the sketch, Exhibit "C", which I have called
to y,our .attention, and which you say you have discussed with Officer Peirce, taking into consideration
your observation of the automobiles which you have
stated, I think, that you observed, the Ford V-8 and
the Oldsmobile which were involved in the accident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Taking into consideration the evidence in
addition to the items which I have mentionedMr. Richards: Which evidence?
Q. (Continued) I am just going to say it. That
the Oldsmobile car turned over twice as it went from
point Circle Z to the point which indicates the place
where it came to a stop, indicated on the blackboard
as "X-4"; taking into consideration the movement
of the cars, as is reflected on the sk~tch Exhibit
"C"-

Mr. Richards: I object to that as being indefinite, the movement of the cars.
170

Q. (Continued) And particularly the fact that
the Ford car, after the impact turned around and
was pointed in a northeasterly direction, and that
the Oldsmobile came to rest with the two rear wheels
over the curb, and pointed in a southwesterly direction, practically west-
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-39The Court: Rig·ht there, Mr. Rawlings, I have
an objection that was made. I thought before you
finished-but I don't think you have added anything
since the objection was made with reference to the
objection to the movement of the cars. By that do
you mean directional movement of the cars?
Mr. Rawlings:
The Court:

Directional movement.

Objection overruled.

You understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. And taking into consideration that the evidence that the Oldsmobile car came to rest at a point
seventy-eight feet northwest and practically north
from a direct line from the point of impact; taking
into consideration the damage to the automobiles, the
tread of the tires on both cars, the type of surfaces
on both roads, and particularly in the intersection,
the elevation transversed, if there were any elevation, the inflation of the tires, composition of the
roads, the point of impact of the two cars, and any
other evidence reflected on the sketch, Exhibit "C",
have you an opinion as to the rate of speed that the
car was traveling when the brakes were applied at
point X-5.
Q.

Mr. Richards: I object to that, your Honor.
Mr. Rawlings : As is evidenced by the sketch.
:171

Mr. Richards: I object to that question as being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The
proper foundation has not been laid ; and that there
are certain elements in the evidence that have not
been taken into consideration; and there are certain
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-40elements that he has taken into consideration that
are not in evidence ; and that also his examination of
the premises was of a time different than the time of
the accident. There is no proof that the conditions
were the same at that time as of the time of the accident; nor that the condition of the tires, the inflation thereof, was the same at the time of the accident
as they were at the time of his examination.
The Court: He can answer this question "Yes"
or "No", Mr. Richards. Then when he is asked for
his opinion I will consider more seriously your objection, if you have one.
A.

172

Yes.

The other elements I took into consideration in
arriving at this opinion were the weight of the two
cars, the total surface of friction between the tires
and the surface, and no other elements except the use
of the formula mentioned the other day.
Q. You say you have an opinion. All right,
now will you give us your opinion of the speed the
car was traveling at the time that the brakes were
applied, as is evidenced by the sketch, on 3rd East?
Mr. Richards: May we have the same objection
I made to the previous question.

173

The inflation of the tires made no difference.
The tread of the tires is a factor.
Q. The tread of the tires is a factor. Will you
describe, or give us the tread of the automobiles that
you observed.

Mr. Richards: Object to that as immaterial and
incompetent.
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And designate each car.
Mr. Richards: \Vhen did he examine it?
1\Ir. Rawlings: The 28th.
Mr. Richards: Object to it as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The conditions may have
been entirely different after-it undoubtedly was.
The Court: Objection overruled.
Q.

174

The tires on the Ford car were practically new.
The tread was good on all four tires. The tires on
the Oldsmobile were pretty well worn with the exception of one rear tire which was a little newer than
the others. The weight of the cars enters into my
computation. I know the shipping weight of the
automobile. The shipping weight of a car is the
weight without any gasoline, oil, accessories or extras or passengers.
Q. What is the weight?
Mr. Richards: Object to it as immaterial.

175

The Court: I think the factor I mentioned or
suggested is probably a matter of rebuttal, if it
exists. Objection overruled. You may answer.
A. The weight of the Ford car is 2,927 pounds
shipping weight; and the shipping weight of the
Oldsmobile 3,185 pounds, approximately. I think it
is given on the sketch-it is shown.
Q. Now, will you give us your opinion as to the
speed the car was traveling when the brakes were
applied on 3rd East?
Mr. Richards: I would like the same objection
as I made to the previous question; or I will restate
it.
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-42The Court: No, you may have the same objection, if you want to make your record on it that way,
and the court will consider your objection previously
made as going to this question. Are there any
factors that you took into consideration in ascertaining the speed of this Ford car at the time the brakes
were applied, which have not been mentioned by Mr.
Rawlings in his question to you?
A. The extent of the damage to each car.

176

There is no formula which can be used to arrive
at a mathematical exactitude of the dissipation of
energy in connection with the damaging of the cars.
I base my opinion as to the crushing effect of the
automobiles on the basis of extensive tests that we
made at General Motors Proving Ground and at
Iowa State University.
By the Court :

177

Those are the tests I assisted in and referred to
yesterday. A measurement was always made. A
comparison of damage was made at various speeds
and under various conditions to determine the extent
of the damage. I have conducted an experiment
with an Oldsmobile of this model and year. I have
not made the experiment with a Ford of this model
and year. An Oldsmobile but not a Ford. In using
this factor in determining the speed that the Ford
was going at the time the brakes were applied I
merely estimate the amount of energy dissipated by
the impact of the two cars, which estimate is based
upon my experience. As I understood the question it
was not to include the damage to the car and I esti-
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mated that I could come closer than 95% right without the damage.
The Court: Objection overruled. The witness
may answer and you may save your record on it, Mr.
Richards.
Q. Do you recall the question asked?
A. Regarding the speed, including the damage?
A. 59.3 miles per hour.

Cross Examination by Mr. Richards.

179

I have not been in court during all of the trial.
I came in yesterday afternoon. Mr. Peirce was the
first witness after I came in. I heard your cross examination of Mr. Peirce and that is all of his evidence I heard. I did not hear the evidence of the
other witnesses. The opinion I have given is taking
into consideration certain information Mr. Peirce
gave to me at some other time. I read the statement of the witnesses he has in his police report and
that is where I got my facts from with the .exception
of the facts Mr. Rawlings has shown on the board
and my own observations. I did not examine the
highway until approximately February 29th. That
was the first time I examined it. I have examined it
since that time. To determine an incline or decline
of a highway I have an instrument on my car. When
I examined Third East Street, the street looked dry.
It was black asphalt pavement on 21st South and on
Third East it was an oil surface. There was a small
portion of loose gravel in the center of the intersection. I do not know how much loose gravel there
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was on the day of the accident. My opinion is based
on what I saw at the time I examined it. I made allowance in regards to friction but I based that on
what I found when I examined it. I figured approximately the speed of the Oldsmobile from several factors at 37 miles per hour. When I say "approximately," I mean that would be about 90% correct. I
figured the Ford a little closer because the movement
of the Ford after the impact was less and not as
complicated as the movements of the Oldsmobile.
The skid marks I figured as a reduction of speed at
30.5. In the 14 foot skid marks I took into consideration and added it to the Ford's speed. That is, a portion of the 14 foot skid marks. This made a reduction of about three iniles per hour. The momentum
of the Oldsmobile would assist the Ford in swinging
around and I took that into consideration. The distance mentioned in the direction of the Oldsmobile
could be accredited to the Oldsmobile whereas the
distance moved in the direction of the Ford could be
accredited to the Ford. It is true that if the Ford
came to rest and the Oldsmobile hooked on, the
momentum of the Oldsmobile could advance the Ford
to some extent in the same direction that it was going. From a study of the photographs and experience
in similar accidents I would say that the Oldsmobile
did not catch the Ford with part of it and throw it.
Yes, I have seen accidents very nearly the same as
this. That is, one car going 59 miles per hour and
the other going 37 and ·striking under the same conditions and causing the same result. I have not seen
an Oldsmobile hit a Ford but have seen a car with
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the same weight. The construction of different cars
makes a difference but the chassis is practically the
same on new cars. The body cushions the impact
but it does not take the impact. I doubt if it would
give something to hang on to. I did not use the same
formula for figuring the speed of the Oldsmobile because there are no brake marks. The skid marks of
26 feet I applied to the Oldsmobile. That is, the
straight portion. The arc was contributed possibly
by the change in direction. Taking the speed at
33.5 up to the arc in the 14 foot skids to make up
the 59 miles per hour, I take into consideration the
direction over to here in the air, is the product of
the weight of that car by the distance which it
travels in the air. The distance is the perpendicular
distance to the intended direction of travel over to
a point approximately the center of where the skid
marks begin. As to whether the Oldsmobile was
absolutely free and clear, that is all four wheels off
the pavement from the point of impact to the beginning of the skid marks, which are marked 20
and 26 feet, I take it that if they had not been there
would be some indications on the pavement where
the wheels had been touching. No, there are no
skid marks down 21st South but anything in the air
hitting the pavement would leave a mark, of any
weight. It would have to go one or two feet to
leave a mark. Every time the car goes over a bump,
if it goes sufficiently high it would leave a mark
on the pavement where the wheels come down. It
would leave a definite mark if the distribution of
weight was the same as in this case. By that I
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mean that the heavy portions of the car that are in
the air tend to go to the ground first so that the
front end or front wheels in the air would hit first.
If the evidence showed that only two wheels left the
ground, that would make a difference in my calculations, and if the back wheels were still rolling
on the ground, they would not make a mark. The
distance I used for the car being in the air was ten
feet and the energy consumed thereby would be
3,400 pounds weight of the Oldsmobile down to that
ten feet, or 34,000 pounds of energy. I have not
broken that down to miles per hour. I use total
energy. I didn't break each of them down. I
summed them up and then arrived at my total factor.
Q. Would it take long?
A. No, I will do it right here on the board,
if you want.
Q. All right.
A. (Witness figures on blackboard.) That is,
if this were all the energy that were involved-it
doesn't amount to quite that much, considered as a
whole, so you really get into a largerV=5.5 /-E-

-w-

= 5.5

!3'4000
. 3200

= 17.9 miles per hour
Q. What is your final figure?
A. It is a square root. It is just a complication. When you take a square root of a number,
you, for instance-if you double this number and
that square root you don't double this, so it is better
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-it is correct (indicating), this wouldn't be correct. Trying to break these down it would be correct; trying to determine the total energy at this
point and applying it, if I add all these together
then I would probably get 75 instead of 59.3.
If only two wheels were off the ground, this
34,000 would be about 28,000. It would not make
any difference which two wheels were off the ground
nor their height. The distance off the ground is not
involved in this calculation but I used four feet
off the ground the other day as that is another portion of the energy. One witness' testimony which
I read said five or six, but I use three. In considering that energy I considered all four wheels off
the ground. The only difference this would make, if
the car were raised so its mass were raised three
feet, it wouldn't make any difference, but if the high
point were only three feet off the ground, then it
would cut the energy approximately in half. Even
though the evidence indicated that the front end
was all that could be seen off the ground five or six
feet, I say I have never seen a collision of that kind
where all four wheels did not go off the ground.
By the downward force I mean the force which
pushed the Oldsmobile to the pavement, the weight
of the Ford as it suddenly stopped pitches to the
front, as anyone who drives a car knows. (Using
the models in court as a demonstration.) To exaggerate, these wheels might not come entirely off
the ground but the springs would be raised so that
the weight of the car is directed in a downward
direction and the fact, from this photograph, that
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this running board on the Oldsmobile, and everything is pushed down, indicates that there was a
force pushing down on this car so that the springs
and tires of the other car were pushed down and
acting as a catapult so that the car pushed down
immediately after the impact. Then the spring
motion of the two cars releases them and the car
pushed down by reason of the tension in the springs
and because the air in the tires is compressed, will
come out into the air, and that is what forces it
up three feet. Sometimes it is the combination of
forcing down and lifting up. That is, if the car was
low enough down so it could get under the other,
which I do not think it would in this case, it would
knock it up into the air like hitting a golf ball. The
speed of the Oldsmobile would not have any appreciable effect on it going up in the air. It is true
that if a body is moving at quite a rate of speed
and gets caught on something it has a tendency for
its upper end to raise, particularly if it is struck
towards the rear, but in this case the striking was
practically in the center.
Q. That wouldn't mean right instantly after
the striking of the back fenders or door handles or
something on the Oldsmobile, wouldn't stop some
of that speed of the Oldsmobile and shoot it in the
airA. No.
Q. So that part of this raising would be the
speed of the Oldsmobile?
A. No.
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-49Q. It wouldn't. You don't concern with that
at all?
A. Not appreciably. In the range of tests
from twenty to sixty miles per hour of the car,
which would be the yellow car, the Oldsmobile car
in this case, the difference in the lift over that range
was only approximately six inches, and the cars
were lifted around five to five and one-half feet by a
car going at sixty miles per hour.

191

L92

.93

In the test that I have made there was only a
difference of six inches in the height which the car
jumped. We ranged the speed of the cars from 20
to 60 miles an hour, with the other car going at a
speed of sixty when it reaches the point of impact.
That is, increasing its velocity. We tried other cases
with a man at the wheel applying the brakes. I
have never seen an accident where the front went
up and the back didn't. I have seen the front go a
little higher but both left the ground. We had tests
having them hit at the point of gravity which is
back about 3Y2 feet from the front axel and 24
inches off the ground. This might vary some with
passengers and accessories in the car. The combination of gouge and paint marks was contributed
to the speed of the Oldsmobile and the coefficient between metal and pavement is around 6/10. The
gouges would probably increase this. I did not increase it. However, it would not make the Oldsmobile be going much faster. The difference of one
or two points in coefficient does not change much.
This distance of seventy-eight feet was used to determine the actual distance parallel to the direction
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of travel of the Oldsmobile. The distance from
where the skid marks are to where the car jumped
over the curb, I contribute the loss of energy or
speed to the Oldsmobile. I did not break that down,
however. It would make a difference as to how the
Oldsmobile struck the pavement in making its turns.
I did not see it but I think I know from the photograph and other experiences and the damage to the
car that it was quite on its nose. Yes, I attributed
to the Ford a portion of the damage to the Oldsmobile. All of the damage which was done to the
left side of the car and the damage that was done
to the frame of the car in springing the frame out
in the direction of the travel of the Ford and the
tearing loose of its supports underneath the frame
itself. If the car went up in the air six feet and
dropped, it couldn't damage the frame by the fall
to the extent of the way it was damaged. I mean
that absolutely. The dropping of the drive shaft
and so on possibly might have been done by that.
I eliminated that part and considered it in determining the speed of the Oldsmobile. But it wasn't
a big factor. Taking the rule of physics where two
forces are pulling in different directions, the resultant will lie closer to the greater force. The reason the Oldsmobile was not further north on Third
East rather than west on Twenty-first South was
because a large portion of the energy of the Ford
had been dissipated in the brakes and another part
of the energy was dissipated in the damage to the
cars at the time of impact and that the speed and •
force of the Oldsmobile was not retarded as much
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as the Ford by the impact. The total swing of the
Ford was not caused by the momentum of the Oldsmobile. It might probably have been assisted by
the Ford's wheels being cramped. I do not know
whether it would have been assisted by the power of
the motor carrying the Ford forward. This could
not have had much bearing on the matter, though,
as it only moved fourteen feet. From my experience, the time a man starts to put on his brakes
and when they take a hold, and having brakes and
the type of road and tires here involved, is practically nil. Of course, if you are going sixty miles
an hour and see an object and go to stop, before skid
marks would appear there is a reaction time which
is different with different drivers. There are
formulas worked out for this. They are worked out
the same as the other formulas from experience and
practice. The paper you showed me is one I developed. At sixty miles an hour I have sixty-six
feet. That is the so-called reaction time of %, second
which is an average for drivers for ordinary conditions. The reaction time in this case would probably be much shorter. It all depends on the individual. It has been registered as low as .5 of a
second. "Thinking distance" means the time you
are coming down the street and you see something
and you have got to stop and you have to flash to
your brain and the brain back to the foot in order
to apply the brake. That is, at sixty miles an hour
you would go sixty-six feet in 3,4 of a second. And
if you had somebody that thought a little slower
than the average, it would extend to a greater time.
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I contributed to the speed of the Ford all of
the damage to the frame of the Oldsmobile that indicated the direction of travel of the Ford. If a car
fell hard on its nose, it would not bend the frame
out if it had tires and springs to cushion the motion.
By the time it got to the frame it was considerably
damped out because of the action of the tires and
springs and it wouldn't be a direct impact on the
frame and chassis of the car. By cushioned I mean
that some of the force had been absorbed. As to
just how much, it is hard to tell. Once in the while
there is a defect which would make a difference but
I did not find a defect from my examination of the
Oldsmobile. There wasn't any such bending outward shown by the tests that I was a party to. The
Oldsmobile is a 1935 model and we tested those cars
in 1936. No, the question of crystalization would
not make any difference. I never saw the Oldsmobile before the accident and I do not know whether
it had ever been in any other accident before.

Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings.

203

In the tests made I have never seen a Ford car
used but we did use cars of approximately the same
weight and construction as the Ford. From my
examination of the Oldsmobile I saw that the near
side of the car, the left side, on which it was struck,
was smashed in considerably and on the far side
the upright post was torn loose and the front door
was torn from its hinges. The frame itself was
bowed out approximately three inches from its
normal position and the X frame was torn loose
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from the gusset plate, the rivets were torn out and
the plate which supports the motor in the knee
action was also torn in the near side and it was quite
washboardy near the center. The tires and wheels
were not damaged. The main damage as far as
energy which was involved is concerned was to the
frame itself which was constructed of pressed steel
shapes and supported by an X frame riveted to the
side. By an X frame I mean that the X meets the
four corners of the frame back of the motor. The
X frame is constructed of steel sections which have
been pressed into shape. The channel is constructed
of approximately 3/32 thick material, bent into a
channel "C" shaped, which is the main member on
each side of the frame. Both were bowed, the near
one more than the far one and the X was torn from
the gusset plate. They are a little better than three
inches in width. That is, the long part of the "C" and
the short part of the "C" is about 11,4 inches wide.
The damage to the Ford was restricted to the front
and the engine was not damaged. The radiator was
pushed back and the bumper was pushed against
the front tires and beyond. On one side it was
skewed and the support to the bumpers on one side
was completely crushed and one bolt was torn out.
The frame beyond the front axle was not harmed.
The bumper took a good deal of the shock as it is
so designed.

Recross Examination by Mr. Richards.
The Ford shows that something took a hold of
the right side and pulled it to the left. Very likely
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that was the rear that was probably up here momentarily and slipped along. I would not say that
it hooked on. I would say that you got a crushing
action which isn't very much in order to crush
twenty gauge fenders. Yes, you can make the front
of a car look pretty bad with very little damage.
As near as I can tell, the engine was pushed back
but I did not work on the car. When a car is pushed
down to the pavement, as I have described the Ford
pushed the Oldsmobile down, usually the tires grip
the pavement with such force that they don't move
enough to burn any rubber and the forward motion
would not make a mark. Sometimes they do move,
however. So a mark would not be made by pushing
it down but by a force hitting its side. If it should
bounce in the air two feet and drop to the pavement,
it would leave a mark.

206

IT IS STIPULATED between counsel that the
south line of 21st South Street is the end of Salt
Lake City limits and that the land lying south of
that line is in Salt Lake County.
Both parties rest.

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND
DISMISSAL.
207

Mr. Richards: Comes now the defendant, Jess
Anderson, and moves this court for a directed verdict, and also for a motion of dismissal in this case
upon the following grounds :
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-551. That the defendant has never had a preliminary hearing.

2. That the Information does not state a cause
of action, or crime against this defendant.
3. That there is no evidence to support the
charges alleged in the information, or any fact
shown that the defendant wilfully, and with wanton
disregard of the rights of others and without due
caution and circumspection did endanger or kill
Clark Romney.
There is also no evidence to show that the person who vvas in the automobile accident was Clark
Romney.
5. That there is clearly evidence to show that
the injury to the person driving the Oldsmobile was
caused by the wrongful and negligent act of that
party, and that said party was not driving in a
proper manner.
The Court: By that you mean the sole proximate cause of the death was the act and conduct of
the party driving the Oldsmobile. Is that what you
mean?
Mr. Richards : That is one ground though I
was going a little lighter than that, due to their
allegations.
The Court: Just so I understand. I am not
trying to tell you how to make your motion.

:08

Mr. Richards: I also make the further ground
that the party injured in the Oldsmobile-such injuries were caused by the sole and personal acts of
the driver of the Oldsmobile.
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-56The Court : Motion denied.
Mr. Rawlings: Your Honor, I would like, at
this time, to reopen the case for one bit of evidence
which I think maybe should be presented to your
Honor, and the jury, in respect to the stop sign.
Mr. Richards : The defendant resists on the
ground it prejudices the defendant, and we have already rested and closed our case, and also submitted
our instructions to the court.
Mr. Rawlings: I won't have any objection to
them putting on any evidence they desire, after I
conclude.
The Court : You may make your record on it,
Mr. Richards, in case the court is in error, but I will
grant the motion over your objection.
FOSTER KUNZ was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and after being first duly sworn
testified as follows :

210

My name is Foster Kunz and I reside at 145
Third Avenue. I have lived in Salt Lake for about
a year. I have been working for about a year for
the State of Utah in the Traffic Safety Department
with the State Road Commission during that period
of time. I am Traffic Safety Engineer. It is my
duty and responsibility to supervise matters pertaining to the erection and maintenance of stop
signs. I am familiar with the highway commonly
known and designated as "Twenty-first South", particularly in the vicinity of Third East Street. Twenty-first South Street is under the jurisdiction of the
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-57State Road Commission so far as erection of state
highway signs is concerned.

Voir Dire Examination by Mr. Richards.
211

I ''"as not there when it was erected and I did
not see it erected.

Further Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings.
212

The jurisdiction of the State Road Department
to erect stop signs comes by virtue of statute. The
signs are erected at Third East and Twenty-first
South Street by our sign department. The sign department is under my direction. I have nine men
in that department. I keep a record of the work that
they do and the signs that they erect. That record
is kept under my jurisdiction by those men. I have
examined the records to determine by whom the
sign at Twenty-first South and Third East was
erected.

Further Voir Dire Examination by Mr. Richards.
213

I do not keep the record myself. It is kept by
the sign shop foreman.
By the Court:
I do not check the record ordinarily for accuracy. I do not make any kind of inspection. I do go
to see that the work is being done.
By Mr. Rawlings:
I did go and investigate to see if the stop sign
was erected at 21st South at the time the project was
completed on November 3, 1939. The road was
widened in that vicinity and the improvements to the
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-58road were made by the State Road Commission.
After that was done, I checked to see if the signs
were erected. I made a general inspection of the entire project and all signs were erected in accordance
with our log. The log provides that stop signs be
erected on the southeast corner of that intersection.
215

Q. Do you know whether or not the State Road
Commission erected a stop sign at the intersection
of Twenty-first South and Third East on the southeast corner.

Mr. Richards: I object to it as being incompetent, immaterial and not within the knowledge of
this witness.
The Court:
A.

Objection overruled.

Yes, it did.

It was erected between October 23rd and November 3rd. The sign shown in Exhibit "G" is one
like our signs. I could not say definitely that it is
the sign. It is a regular standard stop sign erected
by the State of Utah.

Cross Examination by Mr. Richards.

216

I do not know the exact date I made the inspection but I always go over the projects after they have
been signed. I do this within a week after. I remember I went over this in November, 1939. It is
correct that all I know is that as Engineer of the
Safety Department I ordered a stop sign to be put
at that street and that thereafter was advised by a
report that one had been put there and later I inspected it and there was a sign.
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-59Mr. Richards: Your Honor, I move that his
testimony be stricken on the ground that it is clearly
shown it is not within his knowledge to testify that
the sign was actually put there by the State Road
Commission.
The Court : Motion denied.

n7

(Both parties rest with the understanding that
the motion of dismissal and for directed verdict
heretofore made shall be considered as made after
the introduction of this last testimony and that the
same rulings made at that time are now made.)

(Title of Court and Cause.)
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.
7-219

:7-219

fl

No.1.
You are instructed that the defendant, Jess
Anderson, is charged by the information which has
been duly filed in this case with the crime of involuntary manslaughter, in substance committed as follows: That on the 25th day of February, 1940, at
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Jess
Anderson, did unlawfully and without malice kill
Clark Romney.
No.2.
You are instructed that instruction No. 1 is not
to be regarded by you as a statement of the facts
proved in this case, but is to be regarded by you
solely as a summarized statement of the essential allegations contained in the information.
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No.3.
You are instructed that to the charge contained
in the information the defendant has entered a plea
of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies each
and all of the essential allegations contained in the
information and casts upon the State the burden
of proving each and all of the essential allegations
therein contained to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. The mere fact that the defendant
stands charged with a crime is not to be taken by
you in and by itself as any evidence of his guilt.

No.4.
8-219
You are instructed that involuntary manslaughter, insofar as material to this case, is defined
by the laws of the State of Utah as the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony, when such unlawful act is committed by the
defendant in such manner as to evince on his part
marked disregard for the safety of others, or recklessness.
9-220

No.5.
You are instructed that the laws of the State of
Utah in force on the 25th day of February, 1940,
provide as follows :
First: That it shall be unlawful for any person
to drive any vehicle upon a~y highway carelessly and
heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the
rights and safety of others.
Second: That it shall be unlawful for any
person to drive any vehicle upon any highway with-
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-61out due caution and circumspection and at such a
speed or in such a manner as to endanger any person or property.
Third: That it shall be unlawful for any person to drive any vehicle upon any highway at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent, having due
regard for the traffic, surface and width of the
highway and the hazards at intersections, and any
other condition then existing.
Fourth: That it shall be unlawful for any person to drive any vehicle upon any highway at a speed
which is greater than will permit the driver to exercise proper control of the vehicle and to decrease
speed or to stop, as may be necessary, to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle or other conveyance
upon or entering the highway in compliance with the
legal requirements and with the duty of drivers and
other persons using the highway, to exercise due
care.
Fifth: That it shall be unlawful for any person
to fail to stop in obedience to a stop sign, bearing the
words "Stop" in letters of a size to be clearly legible
from a distance of one hundred feet, placed at an
intersection, which said stop sign is placed there by
the State Road Commission or by the local authority
having said intersection under its jurisdiction.
You are further instructed that anyone violating any of the provisions of law as set forth above
is guilty of the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony.
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No.6.
You are instructed that before you can find the
defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter as
charged in the information you must believe from
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the following:
First: That the defendant, Jess Anderson, at
the time and place alleged in the information was
driving and operating an automobile on said highway, and in so doing violated one or more of the provisions of the statutes of the State of Utah set forth
in instruction No. 5.
Second : That in violating one or more of the
provisions of the statute set forth in instruction 5,
if you find such violation beyond a reasonable doubt,
the defendant acted recklessly or in such a manner
as to evince marked disregard for the safety of
others.
Third: That in so driving and operating his
automobile, as set forth in paragraphs numbered
"First" and "Second" of this instruction, the defendant proximately caused the collision between his
automobile and the automobile which was being
operated by the deceased, Clark Romney.
Fourth: That the said Clark Romney received
injuries as a result of said collision from which he
died within a year and a day from February 25th,
1940.
Fifth: That the killing of Clark Romney was
directly and proximately caused, as that term is
hereafter defined for you in these instructions, by
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-63the violation of one or more of the provisions of the
statute as set forth in instruction 5 committed in
such a manner as to evince on the part of the defendant marked disregard for the safety of others or
recklessness.
Sixth : That the killing of Clark Romney was
without malice.
.1-222

.2-222

You are further instructed that the burden is
upon the State to convince you by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that all of the above enumerated
elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter
are present in this case. If the State has failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of said
enumerated elements set forth in this instruction
then you must acquit the defendant.
No. 6-A .
You are instructed that if you believe from the
evidence that the defendant, Jess Anderson, was
guilty of an unlawful act or acts, not amounting to
a felony, in the manner in which he operated his
automobile at the time and place in question, and in
the commission of such unlawful act or acts evinced
a marked disregard for the safety of others, or recklessness, but also believe from the evidence that such
act or acts committed in such manner in no way
proximately caused the collision of his automobile
and the automobile of the deceased, Clark Romney,
and the injuries to Clark Romney, then you may not
find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, but must return a verdict of not guilty.
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No.7.
You are instructed that by the term "Proximate
cause", as used in these instructions, is meant that
cause which in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any other cause, produced the injury
and without which the injury would not have occurred.
No.8.
You are instructed that the phrase "Wilful and
14-223
wanton disregard for the rights and safety of
others" means recklessness or marked disregard for
the rights and safety of others. It does not involve
an active, conscious or specific intent or determination on the part of the defendant to violate a law or
to injure another.

13-223

No. 8-A.
15-223
You are instructed that in the crime of involun~
tary manslaughter, so far as material to this case,
there must be a union or joint operation of the unlawful act and criminal negligence. And in this connection criminal negligence means that the unlawful act must be done in such a manner as to more
than constitute a mere thoughtless omission or slight
deviation from the norm of prudent conduct. It
must be reckless or in marked disregard for the
safety of others.
Throughout the whole of these instructions the
terms "Reckless" and "Recklessness" mean conduct
evincing marked disregard for the safety of others;
that is; the terms as here used mean more than a
mere thoughtless omission or slight deviation from
prudent conduct.
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-65No.9.
16-22-!
You are instructed that the mere fact that an
accident happened and that the defendant was involved therein is not to be taken by you as proof
in and of itself that the defendant was at the time
and place in question engaged in an unlawful act or
acts, or that he acted recklessly or in such a manner
as to evince a marked disregard for the safety of
others.
No. 10.
17-224
You are instructed that the defendant in this
case had a right to go upon the witness stand and
testify in his own behalf, if he chose so to do. The
law, however, expressly provides that no presumption adverse to him is to arise from the mere fact
that the defendant has not availed himself of the
privilege which the law gives him and should not be
permitted by you to prejudice him in any way.
No. 11.
18-224
The Court charges you that it is the imperative
and sworn duty of the jury to hear and determine
this case on the testimony of the witnesses given on
the trial. In determining questions of fact, you
are not at liberty to indulge in conjectures not based
on evidence introduced in the case; nor are you at
liberty to follow your own ideas of what the law is
or ought to be. On the contrary, you should look
solely to the evidence for the facts, and to the instructions given you by the Court for the law, and
return a verdict according to the facts established
by the evidence and law laid down by the Court.
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-66Sympathetic feelings have no place whatever in the
trial of a case in a court of justice. You should disregard all such influence and determine the case according to the law and the evidence given you in
oven court, and with fairness and impartiality.
You should not consider, or be influenced by,
any evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by the Court, but only such evidence as has been admitted in the case. You should
not consider, or be influenced by, any statement of
counsel as to what the evidence is, unless they state
it correctly, or by any statement of counsel of facts
not shown in evidence, if any such has been made.
You should not be influenced by any statements the
court may have made in ruling upon questions of
law or otherwise in your hearing, if any have been
made, that seem to indicate any opinion upon any
question of fact.
No. 12.
You are the sole judges of the weight of the
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the
facts. In weighing the testimony you may consider
the bias of any witness, if any is shown, to testify
in favor of or against either party; the interest, if
any is shown, which any witness has or may have in
the result of the trial. You may consider the appearances of the witnesses on the witness stand, and any
motive or probable motive which any witness may
have to tell that which is not true, and from all the
facts and circumstances given in evidence before you,
determine what weight ought to be given to the testimony of any witness.
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-67You are not bound to believe all that the witnesses may have testified to, nor are you bound to believe any witness; you may believe one witness as
against many, or many witnesses as against one.
In case there is a conflict in the testimony of the
witnesses, it is your duty to reconcile such conflict
so far as you can, but it is still for you to determine
for yourselves where the ultimate truth of the case
is.
If you shall believe any witness has wilfully
testified falsely, as to any material fact in the case,
you are at liberty to disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness, except as he may have been
corroborated by credible witnesses or credible evidence in the case.
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
By a reasonable doubt is meant a doubt based
on reason, and which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence .
.9-226

~

And if, after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence in the case, you can
candidly say that you are not satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if, after
such impartial consideration and comparison of all
the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have
an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, such
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-68as you would be willing to act upon in the more
weighty and important matters relating to your own
affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. It must be
a real, substantial doubt, and not one that is merely
possible or imaginary. It should fairly, naturally
and reasonably arise out of the evidence or lack of
evidence in the case.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree
of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the
understandi:r:g of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the
evidence must, to your minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the
defendant. That is to say, if after an entire consideration and comparison of all the testimony in the
case, you can reasonably explain the facts given in
evidence on any reasonable ground other than the
guilt of the defendant, you should acquit him.
19-227

No. 13.
These instructions, though numbered separately,
are by the jury to be considered and construed as
one connected whole. Each instruction should be
read and understood in reference to and as a part of
the entire charge and not as though one instruction
separately were intended to present the whole law
of the case upon any particular point.
No. 14.
When you retire to deliberate you should appoint one of your number foreman. Your verdict
must be in writing, signed by your foreman, and
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-69when found must be returned by you into Court.
Your verdict in this case must be guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter as charged in the information, or
not guilty, as your deliberations may result.
In criminal cases it requires a unanimous concurrence of all the jurors to find a verdict.
M. J. BRONSON, Judge.

Dated May 22, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
EXCEPTIONS TO COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS.
228

Mr. Richards: Comes now the defendant and
excepts to the court giving the following instructions:
Excepts to the whole of Instruction No. 4.

229

Excepts to the whole of Instruction No. 5.
Excepts to the first paragraph, No. 1, of Instruction No. 5.
Excepts to paragraph No. 2 of Instruction No. 5.
Excepts to paragraph No. 3 of Instruction No. 5.
Excepts to paragraph No. 4 of Instruction No. 5.
The Court:

Your reasons?

Mr. Richards: Do you want me to state them?
I don't think it is necessary for the record. I will
tell you frankly-do you want this in the record?
The Court : It is up to you.
Mr. Richards : Excepts to the following portion
of Instruction No. 5 :
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-70"You are further instructed that anyone
violating any of the provisions of law as set
forth above is guilty of the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony."
Excepts to Instruction No. 6, and the whole
thereof.
Excepts to paragraph No. 1 of Instruction
No.6.
Excepts to the following portion of paragraph
No. 1 of Instruction No. 6 :
"And in so doing violated one or more of
the provisions of the statutes of the State of
Utah set forth in Instruction No. 5."
Excepts to the second paragraph of Instruction No.6.
Excepts particularly to the following portion of
the second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 :
"That in violating one or more of the provisions of the statute set forth in Instruction 5."
230

Excepts to the third paragraph of Instruction
No.6.
Excepts to the fifth paragraph of Instruction
No.6.
Excepts to the following portion of the fifth
paragraph of Instruction No. 6 :
"By the violation of one or more of the
provisions of the statute as set forth in Instruction 5.
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-71Excepts to Instruction No. 6-A, and the whole
thereof.
Excepts to the following portion of Instruction No. 6-A :
"You are instructed that if you believe
from the evidence that the defendant, Jess
Anderson, was guilty of an unlawful act or acts,
not amounting to a felony, in the manner in
which he operated his automobile at the time
and place in question."
Excepts to Instruction No. 8, and the whole
thereof.
Excepts to the following portion of Instruction
No.9:
"Engaged in an unlawful act or acts."
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 1.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 2.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 3.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 4.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 5, marked as
given.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 6.

n

Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7.
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-72Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 8.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 9.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 10.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 11.
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 12.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
VERDICT.

232

We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find
the defendant Jess Anderson guilty of involuntary
manslaughter as charged in the information.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
35

No. 1.
You are instructed that unless you find beyond a
reasonable doubt from the evidence introduced in
this case each and every one of the following:
That the defendant, Jess Anderson, was
driving the automobile at the time and place of the
accident involved in this case.
l.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-73~. That a person known as Clark Romney died
as a result of injuries received in an automobile accident between a car driven by the defendant and a
car in which the said Clark Romney was driving.

3. That the accident was caused by reason of
the fact that the defendant drove his automobile in
excess of forty miles per hour immediately before he
entered the intersection in question and because he
failed to stop at a stop sign facing south on Third
East Street at the intersection of said street with
21st South Street.
4. That the acts of failing to stop at the stop
sign and driving in excess of forty miles per hour,
taken into consideration with the surrounding circumstances such as the time of day, the amount of
traffic upon said highway and the condition of said
highway, are determined by you to be such acts as
would be considered as driving in a reckless manner
and with marked disregard for the rights of others,
as otherwise defined and explained in these instructions; then your verdict must be not guilty.

36

l9

No.2.
You are instructed that before you can find
the defendant guilty you must find that he failed
both to stop at a stop sign at which he was required
to stop and was going in excess of at least forty
miles per hour when he entered the intersection.
No.5.
You are instructed that unless you find from the
evidence that the stop sign on the east side of Third
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-74East Street approximately 24 feet south of the south
curb line of 21st South Street was erected by either
the State Road Commission or the authorities of Salt
Lake City, then you are instructed that the defendant had no duty to stop at said sign and you shall not
take into consideration his failure to stop at said intersection.

41

No.7.
You are instructed that the laws of the state
of Utah provide that where no special hazard exists
the following speed limits shall be lawful: Outside
of the business or residence districts, except as
otherwise limited by this chapter, speeds at all times
shall be reasonable and safe under the general conditions prevailing upon the highway, providing such
speed. shall not exceed fifty miles per hour. You
are further instructed that business and residence
districts are defined as follows :
"Business District. The territory so designated by local authorities and clearly defined by
signs posted on the highway at the limits of said
districts.
"Residence District. The territory within
cities and towns other than the business districts."

42

No.8.
You are instructed that if you find from the evide~ce that the stop sign facing south on Third East
Street is not in a position visible to drivers entering
21st South Street and was not observed by the said
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-75Jess Anderson, then you are instructed that your
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, not guilty.

l3

44

4l6

No.9.
You are instructed that though one while driving an automobile may accidentally kill another, even
though he be chargeable with some actionable negligence, he is not guilty of the crime here charged
unless his negligence is so gross and culpable as to
indicate a callous disregard of human life and of
the probable consequences of his act.
No. 10.
You are instructed that by the words "recklessness and wanton disregard for the rights of others"
is meant that the misconduct or negligence of the
accused was of more reprehensible character than
mere inadvertence or want of ordinary care. It
must be that there was on his part either a willful
intent to injure or that recklessness and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of another or his
property was such as would be equivalent to intent to
injure.
No. 12.
You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that said defendant did fail to stop at the stop sign at Third East
and 21st South Streets and that he was driving in
excess of forty miles an hour and that such were
the cause of the accident which resulted in the death
of one Clark Romney, but you further find that the
failing to stop at said stop sign and the going in
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-76excess of forty miles an hour was not done by the
said defendant, Jess Anderson, with a wilful and
wanton disregard for the rights of others, then your
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, not guilty.

SETTLEMENT OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
238

The defendant herein proposes and serves the
foregoing as and for its Bill of Exceptions herein,
consisting of 177 pages.
F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.

EDWARD

STIPULATION.
239

The foregoing Bill of Exceptions is returned by
the plaintiff to the defendant this 24th day of
August, 1940, with no amendments offered or proposed and it is stipulated that the foregoing Bill of
Exceptions may be allowed and settled by the Court
as a true and correct Bill of Exceptions in the within
entitled action.
Dated this 24th day of August, 1940.

W. RAWLINGS,
By Brigham E. Roberts,
Deputy,
Attorney for Plaintiff,

CALVIN

F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.

EDWARD
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-77CERTIFICATE SETTLING BILL OF
EXCEPTIONS.
240

I, M. J. Bronson, District Judge who tried the
foregoing cause, do hereby certify that the above
and foregoing Bill of Exceptions, consisting of 17 _____ _
pages numbered from 1 to 17 ______ , inclusive, together
with plaintiff's Exhibits "A" to "I", contains all of
the testimony and evidence offered, admitted or adduced upon the trial of said cause, together with all
of the objections and exceptions taken and corrections made and all proceedings had during the trial
thereof and contains sufficient reference to all exhibits therein referred to to identify the same.
There being no amendments thereto, said Bill of Exceptions is hereby approved, signed, settled and
allowed as a true Bill of Exceptions in the cause of
State of Utah vs. Jess Anderson, and the Clerk
hereby ordered to file the same.
Dated this 24th day of August, 1940.
M. J. BRONSON, Judge.

(Seal)

(Title of Court and Cause.)

51

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO
MOVE FOR NEW TRIAL.
To the above named plaintiff and its attorney, Calvin
W. Rawlings:
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE that the above named defendant intends to move the above entitled court to vacate and
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-78set aside the verdict rendered in the above cause on
the 23rd day of May, 1940, and to grant a new trial
in said cause upon the following grounds, to-wit:
That the Court misdirected the jury in matters of law.
2. That the court erred in the decision of questions of law arising during the course of the trial,
3. That the court did allow acts in the cause
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant.
4. That the verdict is contrary to the law.
5. That the verdict is contrary to the evidence.
1.

Dated this 25th day of May, 1940.
EDWARD F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.
Filed May 25, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
52

MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
Comes now the defendant above named and
moves the above entitled Court to enter an order
arresting the judgment rendered on the verdict in
the above entitled matter upon the following grounds
and for the following reasons :
1. That the information does not charge the
defendant with the commission of the offense for
which he was tried in that said information charges
voluntary manslaughter, whereas, said defendant
was tried for involuntary manslaughter.
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-792. That the information was filed without the
defendant first having had or waived a preliminary
examination in that the original complaint filed by
the County Attorney's office does not state or charge
that the defendant has committed any crime whatsoever.
3. That the prosecuting attorney did not have
authority to file the information for the reason that
said defendant had neither had nor waived a preliminary examination in that the complaint filed by
the County Attorney's office upon which a preliminary examination was held did not state that the
defendant had committed any crime whatsoever and
particularly did not state that said defendant had
committed the crime of involuntary manslaughter or
voluntary manslaughter.
Said motion will be based upon the files and
records in the above entitled cause.

EDWARD F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Defendant.
Filed June 3, 1940.

(Title of Court and Cause.)
)3

~:

MINUTE ORDER.
Whereupon said motions are argued to the
Court by respective counsel and submitted and the
Court being now fully advised in the premises,
ordered that said motion in arrest of judgment and
motion for a new trial be and the same hereby are
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-80denied. Whereupon the defendant is asked if he
has any legal cause to show why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced at this time and the
defendant having answered that he has none, the
Court now pronounces the following judgment and
sentence:
The judgment and sentence of this Court
is that you Jess Anderson be confined and imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for a
period of 12 months for the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter of which you were found
guilty.

(Title of Court and Cause.)

55

CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE.
Upon motion of Jess Andersen, defendant in the
above named case, for a certificate of probable cause,
and in the opinion of the court there being probable
cause therefor,
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that in the
opinion of the court there is probable cause for
appeal in this cause and the defendant is released
without bond to the custody of Dan Beckstead.
Dated this 22nd day of June, 1940.
M. J. BRONSON, District Judge.

Filed June 22, 1940.
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-81(Title of Court and Cause.)

60

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE.
I, WILLIAM J. KORTH, Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing and hereto attached files contain all the
original papers filed in this Court in the above entitled case, including the original Bill of Exceptions
and Notice of Appeal, together with true copies of
original orders made by the Court the whole constituting the judgment Roll therein. And that the
same is a full, true and correct transcript of the
record as it appears in my office.
I further certify that a Certificate of Probate
Cause, duly signed by the Honorable M. J. Bronson, Judge, was filed on the 22nd day of June, A. D.
1940. I further certify that an Order of Court was
entered on the 22nd day of June releasing the defendant Jess Anderson on his own recognizance.
And I further certify that said Transcript is
by me transmitted to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, pursuant to such appeal.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said Court
at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 29th day of August,
A. D. 1940.
William J. Korth,
Clerk Third District Court,
By Alvin Keddington,
Deputy Clerk.
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-82(Title of Court and Cause.)
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.
Comes now the defendant and appellant above
named and assigns the following errors occurring in
the trial of this cause before the Honorable M. J.
Bronson, one of the Judges of the District Court of
the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and which errors he relies
upon for a reversal of the judgment in this cause:
I.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion
to quash the information (Tr. 23, Abst. 3).
II.
The court erred in denying defendant's demand
for a further bill of particulars (Tr. 29, Abst. 9).
III.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion
to require plaintiff to elect upon which ground of
manslaughter the plaintiff would rely (Tr. 32, Abst.
10).
IV.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion
for a directed verdict of not guilty (Tr. 207, Abst.
54).

v.
The court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial (Tr. 51, Abst. 77).
VI.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion
in arrest of judgment (Tr. 52, Abst. 78).
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-83VII.
The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the following question:
•'Q. How fast did you tell him the Oldsmobile was travelling?" (Tr. 106, Abst. 20.)
VIII.
The court erred in admitting Exhibit "G" in
evidence without limiting the purpose of its admission. (Tr. 126, Abst. 26.)
IX.
The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the following question:
"Q. Mr. Taylor, taking into consideration
your investigation and observations made at the
intersection of 21st South and 3rd East, taking
into consideration sketch, Exhibit 'C', which I
have called to your attention and which you say
you have discussed with Officer Pierce, taking
into consideration your observation of the automobiles which you have stated, I think, you observed the Ford V-8 and the automobile which
were involved in the accident and the evidence
in addition to the items which I have mentioned
that the Oldsmobile car turned over twice as it
went from point Circle X to the point which
indicates the place where it came to a stop indicated on the blackboard as X-4, taking into
consideration the movement of the cars as reflected on sketch, Exhibit 'C', and particularly
the fact that the Ford car after the impact
turned around and was pointed in a north-
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-84easterly direction and that the Oldsmobile came
to rest with the two rear wheels over the curb
and pointed in a southerly direction practically
west and that the evidence that the Oldsmobile
car came to rest at a point 78 feet northwest
and practically north from a direct line from
the point of impact, the damage to the automobiles, the tread of the tires on both cars, the
type of surface on both roads and particularly
at the intersection, the elevation transversed, if
there were any elevation, the inflation of the
tires, composition of the road, point of impact
of the two cars and any other evidence reflected
on Exhibit 'C', have you an opinion as to the
rate of speed that the car was travelling when
the brakes were applied at X-5? (Tr. 169-171,
Abst. 38-39.)

X.
The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the following question:
Now will you give us your opinion as
to the speed the car was traveling when the
brakes were applied on Third East? (Tr. 176178, Abst. 41-43.)
"Q.

XI.
The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the following question:
"Q. What is the weight?" (Tr. 174, Abst.
41.)

XII.
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 4
(Tr. 229, Abst. 69).
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-85XIII.
The court erred in giving Instruction No.5 (Tr.
229, Abst. 60).
XIV.
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 1 of
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 60).
XV.
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 2 of
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 60).
XVI.
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 3 of
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 61).
XVII.
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 4 of
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 61).
XVIII.
The court erred in giving the following portion
of Instruction No. 5 :
You are further instructed that anyone
violating any of the provisions of law as set
forth above is guilty of the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony. (Tr.
229, Abst. 61.)

XIX.
The court erred in giving Instruction No.6 (Tr.
229, Abst. 62).
XX.
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 1 of
Instruction No. 6 (Tr. 229, Abst. 62).
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The court erred in giving the following portion
of Instruction No. 6 :
And in so doing violated one or more of
the provisions of the statutes of the State of
Utah set forth in Instruction No. 5. (Tr. 229,
Abst. 62.)
XXII.
The court erred in giving the second paragraph
of Instruction No. 6. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.)
XXIII.
The court erred in giving the following portion
of the second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 :
That in violating one or more of the provisions of the statute set forth in Instruction No.
5. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.)
XXIV.
The court erred in giving the third paragraph
of Instruction No. 6. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.)
XXV.
The court erred in giving the fifth paragraph of
of Instruction No. 6. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.)
XXVI.
The court erred in giving the following portion
of the fifth paragraph of Instruction No. 6:
By the violation of one or more of the provisions of the statute as set forth in Instruction
5. .(Tr. 230, Abst. 62-63.)
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-87XXVII.
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 6-a.
(Tr. 230, Abst. 63.)
XXVIII.
The court erred in giving the following portion
of Instruction No. 6-A:
You are instructed that if you believe from
the evidence that the defendant, Jess Andersen,
was guilty of an unlawful act or acts, not
amounting to a felony, in the manner in which
he operated his automobile at the time and place
in question. (Tr. 230, Abst. 63.)

XXIX.
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 8.
(Tr. 230, Abst. 64.)
XXX.
The court erred in giving the following portion
of Instruction No. 9 :
Engaged in an unlawful act or acts.
230, Abst. 65.)

(Tr.

XXI.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 1. (Tr. 35, Abst. 72.)
XXXII.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 2 (Tr. 36, Abst. 73).
XXXIII.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 5. (Tr. 39, Abst. 73.)
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-88XXXIV.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 7. (Tr. 41, Abst. 74.)
XXXV.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 8. (Tr. 42, Abst. 74.)
XXXVI.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 9. (Tr. 43, Abst. 75.)
XXXVII.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 10. (Tr. 44, Abst. 75.)
XXXVIII.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 12. (Tr. 46, Abst. 75.)
XXXIX.
That the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence in the following particulars:
(A) That the evidence does not show that the
person injured and who thereafter died by reason of
the accident was one Clark Romney.
(B) That the evidence does not show that the
defendant drove his automobile in a reckless or
marked disregard for the safety of others but shows
that he was driving an automobile at a lawful rate of
speed on Third East and that as soon as he apprehended the stop sign, did everything in his power to
avoid the accident and to protect the rights of others.
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-89WHEREFORE, this appellant and defendant
prays that the foregoing may be considered by this
Court as his assignments of error and that the verdict and judgment appealed from be reversed.
Dated this 27th day of September, 1940.
EDWARD F. RICHARDS,
Attorney for Appellant.

(Duly served and filed.)
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